

13 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DE/P

SUBJECT: Merger of USCIB and IAC

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1. [REDACTED] has kept me generally informed on some of the problems that have come up in connection with the proposed merger of USCIB and IAC, but I have not had the opportunity to get too deeply into the legalistic details which such a merger would entail. Nevertheless, I thought I would jot down a couple of things which I consider have a very important bearing on the problem.

2. I believe that the topmost echelons of our Government, guided and encouraged by the various reports of investigating commissions, study groups and management experts, are making a conscious, though not necessarily publicized, effort to so remold the Government structure as to lift it out of the bureaucratic morass which inhibits our ability to respond promptly to enemy stimulus, from day to day. The President's recommendation with respect to the reorganization of the Department of Defense is a case in point. I think that this is the general approach guiding much of the top level thinking which has been urging strengthening of the DCI's position. More and more, there is the feeling that we can no longer afford government by boards, groups and committees, and that we must, always within the democratic framework of course, so reorganize as to be able to anticipate and deal with challenges rapidly. While it would not be correct to say that we are trying to keep up with the Russians in this respect or to emulate them in any way, I think it is correct to say that, as we had to resort to certain arbitrary short cuts in fighting the last hot war against Hitler, we are finding (and a little later than we should have) that it is necessary to resort to certain short cuts in fighting the cold war against the Russians. I do not believe this gradual reorganizational tendency is temporary, and I think we will be compelled to continue its pursuit for some long time to come, certainly for as long as the Russians continue to be the threat they are.

3. All this leads to a second point, and that is that the DCI has enjoyed a certain position as Chairman of the IAC and as Director of Central Intelligence which actually accorded much more with top level conceptions of his role, responsibilities and position than has his job as non-voting Chairman of USCIB. It is now proposed, in the face of

SECRET

- 2 -

what I gather to be rather insistent top level urgings that he assert himself and strengthen his position, that his inhibited USCIB role be in effect expanded to encompass the role he has played in the IAC, thus diluting even further his current position. I understand it has even been suggested that the new "board" use a two-thirds voting rule.

4. I believe it was a mistake for us to consider seriously the use of the word "board" in connection with the merged body. A board runs things. If the "board" concept is pursued to its logical conclusion, we will not longer have a DCI in anything other than name, and we will be running diametrically counter to all the top level recommendations and to the important trend I have described above. We will be reapproaching instead of getting away from the situation which the establishment of the IAC with a DCI was intended to cure. We will be walking down the road which led German Intelligence to its sad end in World War II. And if we ever buy this two-thirds vote business we might as well agree to abolish USCIB and IAC and turn the whole thing over to the Secretary of Defense or some other top military figure with State and this Agency playing clearly subordinate and secondary roles. (The FBI frequently abstains on issues of importance to us, and the Atomic Energy Commission has its own somewhat parochial interests to look after leaving the State Department and this Agency to maintain balance in a critically important agency of Government.)

5. The argument is made that, unless the merged "board" has the authority of USCIB, or if the merged "board" is patterned after the IAC with the Director at least retaining his present position, the Services "won't buy it". If that is true, there should be no merged "board" since the current situation is vastly preferable to the merged "board" as I understand it.

6. The introduction of a voting procedure in the new body, whatever it may come to be called, I would consider totally inconsistent with the concept of a "Director of Central Intelligence". The present procedure in the IAC, whereby matters are either approved by the Committee unanimously or the Director advises the NSC that certain members dissent, is consonant with the position of the Director as the President's and the NSC's chief intelligence officer. The Director and not the Committee is the one responsible to the President and to the NSC. More than once, the Director has gone to the President and to the NSC with a strong position on an issue, when the military services have disagreed. Irrespective of the civilian or service capacity of the Director, the President is entitled to expect the responsible views of his chief intelligence officer without having to feel that he may be getting the results of a weighted, party line vote.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

7. Finally, if it will help any, we can reinforce, by appropriate language, the clear responsibility of the Director to report fully to the NSC the dissenting positions of the other members of the new body. Beyond this, I think it would be a mistake to go.

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**Deputy Chief,
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THK:raw

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